What kind of machine is the mind?

4 pages•Published: June 22, 2012

Abstract

Many computational modeling approaches of the mind seem to be characterized by an implicit strong physicalism, which frequently leads to confusion in philosophy of AI. This work aims at pointing out some fundamental aspects of this problem, both with respect to the relation between epistemological computationalism and physical realization, and the view of symbol manipulation as constrained computation.

Keyphrases: computability, computationalism, functionalism, mind as machine, philosophy of ai

In: Andrei Voronkov (editor). Turing-100. The Alan Turing Centenary, vol 10, pages 16-19.

Links:	https://easychair.org/publications/paper/47j
	https://doi.org/10.29007/k6f4

BibTeX entry

@inproceedings{Turing-100:What_kind_machine_is,
  author    = {Joscha Bach and Mario Verdicchio},
  title     = {What kind of machine is the mind?},
  booktitle = {Turing-100. The Alan Turing Centenary},
  editor    = {Andrei Voronkov},
  series    = {EPiC Series in Computing},
  volume    = {10},
  publisher = {EasyChair},
  bibsource = {EasyChair, https://easychair.org},
  issn      = {2398-7340},
  url       = {/publications/paper/47j},
  doi       = {10.29007/k6f4},
  pages     = {16-19},
  year      = {2012}}

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