Computing Nash Equilibria of Unbounded Games

13 pages•Published: June 22, 2012

Abstract

Using techniques from higher-type computability theory and proof theory we extend the well-known game-theoretic technique of backward induction to finite games of unbounded length. The main application is a closed formula for calculating strategy profiles in Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium even in the case of games where the length of play is not a-priori fixed.

Keyphrases: backward induction, bar recursion, nash equilibrium, selection functions, subgame optimal equilibrium

In: Andrei Voronkov (editor). Turing-100. The Alan Turing Centenary, vol 10, pages 53-65.

Links:	https://easychair.org/publications/paper/D94m
	https://doi.org/10.29007/1wpl

BibTeX entry

@inproceedings{Turing-100:Computing_Nash_Equilibria_Unbounded,
  author    = {Martin Escardo and Paulo Oliva},
  title     = {Computing Nash Equilibria of Unbounded Games},
  booktitle = {Turing-100. The Alan Turing Centenary},
  editor    = {Andrei Voronkov},
  series    = {EPiC Series in Computing},
  volume    = {10},
  publisher = {EasyChair},
  bibsource = {EasyChair, https://easychair.org},
  issn      = {2398-7340},
  url       = {/publications/paper/D94m},
  doi       = {10.29007/1wpl},
  pages     = {53-65},
  year      = {2012}}

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